It is not the kindest of reviews. In some sense, Hyde’s review is nominal: Sparrow tries to bring too much within both phenomenology or speculative realism to make the comparison (and critique of phenomenology) work, and that he is both too critical of phenomenology (using Husserl to tar Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, et al.) and too uncritical of those falling under SR. In any case, I do agree with Hyde’s point below, which forms something of the thesis of my own book on the new realisms:
Sparrow’s suggestion (39), following Lee Braver, that Heidegger’s criticism of metaphysics as ontotheology is radically anti-realist misses the mark even more. Traditional realism is a metaphysics of presence. A metaphysics of presence is a metaphysics for which the real is either utterly presently present or eternally present in such a way that time drops out of the picture. That sort of realism is, for Heidegger, wildly misguided, as is any epistemological realism that stems from it. But it does not follow from Heidegger’s lifelong criticism of metaphysics that philosophy becomes human-centric, as the “Letter on Humanism” shows and Sparrow notes (40). What follows from it is that we need to think of being in terms of temporality (in terms of Temporalität not merely the Zeitlichkeit of dasein) or as event.