Jeff Bell is up with a post arguing that arguments between Husserl and Frege over the status of mathematics:
The usual story as I would tell it, simplified as it is, was that one could mark the bifurcation with Frege’s critique of Husserl’s habilitation dissertation, On the Concept of Number. In his critique, Frege rejected Husserl’s strong psychologistic tendencies. On this telling, we begin with shared concerns and problems in the foundations of mathematics but then divergence arises as Frege and Husserl set out addressing these problems and concerns, with Husserl taking up the issue along Brentano’s psychologistic lines, and Frege (and subsequently Russell) rejecting this approach and moving in a decidedly realist direction.
Interestingly, of course, Husserl will himself critique this more “psychologistic” tendency, though his theory of intentionality anchors philosophy in investigations of subjectivity. I think Bell’s way of telling the story is the dominant I heard when first studying Continental, with Continentals providing diachronic analyses of concepts and analytics providing ahistorical conceptual schemes–at least as the story goes. This story leaves out, of course, what was dominant at the time in the UK and across much of the Continent, namely British idealism’s rereadings of Hegel and Bergsonism.